The Nuclear Weapon Archive is a comprehensive resource dedicated to the history, development, and technical aspects of nuclear weapons. It provides detailed information on various nuclear tests, weapon designs, and the progression of nuclear arsenals worldwide. The site also includes historical documents, analysis of nuclear policies, and insights into the effects of nuclear detonations. It serves as an educational tool for those interested in the science, history, and geopolitical implications of nuclear weapons.
The Council on Foreign Relations provides comprehensive information on North Korea's geopolitical situation, its nuclear weapons program, and its relationships with major global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States. The resource covers North Korea’s military developments, economic challenges, human rights issues, and diplomatic efforts. It includes expert analysis, backgrounders, and reports on recent events affecting the region.
The U.S. Naval Institute website, focusing on content related to "North Korea's nuclear" program. It sorts results by relevance and includes a variety of resources such as articles, books, and magazine issues that discuss North Korea's nuclear capabilities, strategies, and the international response to its nuclear tests. The page features contributions from experts and analysts, providing in-depth discussions on security and military aspects related to North Korea's nuclear developments.
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) website focuses on verification activities in North Korea, specifically regarding the country's nuclear program. It provides an overview of the IAEA's efforts and challenges in monitoring North Korea's nuclear activities. The page includes various resources like documents, statements, and videos related to the IAEA’s work in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), highlighting key events and the agency's responses to North Korea's nuclear developments.
You can explore various resources related to "North Korea's nuclear" program on the RAND Corporation's website by visiting this search page. The page will likely feature a variety of analyses, reports, and expert opinions that delve into the strategies, implications, and international responses concerning North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website provides extensive resources on global security and peace issues, including expert analysis, research publications, and event information. It focuses on a variety of topics such as democracy, nuclear policy, and international affairs, offering insights from scholars around the world.
Coming to the issues from different perspectives, the authors together have written an essential work of clear-eyed reflection and authoritative analysis. They refute a number of misconceptions and challenge faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, most important, the idea that North Korea is an irrational nation. Cha and Kang contend that however provocative, even deplorable, the North's behavior may at times be, it is not incomprehensible or incoherent.
"Ever since Korea was first divided at the end of World War II, the tension between its northern and southern halves has riveted-and threatened to embroil-the rest of the world. In this landmark history, now thoroughly revised and updated in conjunction with Korea expert Robert Carlin, veteran journalist Don Oberdorfer grippingly describes how a historically homogenous people became locked in a perpetual struggle for supremacy-and how they might yet be reconciled"-- Provided by publisher.
"A new edition of the definitive overview of contemporary Korean history, updated with new material to account for recent, dramatic events"-- Provided by publisher.
North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its allies in East Asia. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect delivery systems, but Kim Jong-un's regime now appears to be close. Sung Chull Kim, Michael Cohen, and the contributors to this volume contend that the time to prevent North Korea from getting this capability is virtually over, and instead scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact their North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea does develop the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons; how will the United States, South Korea, and China respond; and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.
North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country--one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years--progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021? Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details--described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon--to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington. Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides. The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.
North Korea is the only country to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has conducted several nuclear tests since 2006. Efforts to curb its nuclear ambitions include UN sanctions and international negotiations, such as the Six-Party Talks and summits with U.S. and South Korean leaders. Despite some agreements, like the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, North Korea continues to advance its nuclear capabilities, including developing thermonuclear weapons and working on miniaturization for missile delivery.
North Korea has developed significant ballistic missile capabilities, becoming a key proliferator of missile technology globally. Initially reliant on Soviet and Chinese support, North Korea's missile program is now largely indigenous. They possess various missile types, including short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as submarine-launched missiles. Despite international sanctions and agreements aimed at curbing its missile development, North Korea continues to advance its capabilities and has exported missile technology to several countries. Key tests include the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBMs, which can potentially reach the continental United States.
North Korea continues to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, with an estimated production capability of up to 90 nuclear warheads, likely having assembled around 50. The country is enhancing its missile technology, including solid-fuel long-range strategic missiles and short-range tactical missiles. Despite international sanctions and diplomatic efforts, North Korea remains committed to advancing its nuclear capabilities as a core element of its national security strategy.
North Korea is estimated to have assembled 40-50 nuclear warheads and has the fissile material for 70-90 weapons. It withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006. The UN has imposed several sanctions on North Korea due to its nuclear activities. The profile details North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, delivery systems, history of diplomatic initiatives, and ongoing proliferation concerns.
Video:
Despite sanctions and closed borders, money and materials for Kim Jong-un’s nuclear weapons programme are still finding their way into North Korea, aided by hackers. Where could it lead?
The hackers are back. In fact, the cyber criminals never went away. The Lazarus Heist Season 2 tells the story of the theft of billions of dollars around the globe. Investigators say a secretive, elite North Korean hacking ring is responsible. Nicknamed the Lazarus Group, it’s claimed they are becoming more ambitious, more audacious and more successful. North Korea says it has nothing to do with these cybercrimes, saying the United States is making these allegations to try and tarnish its image.
The Lazarus Heist podcast is presented by cybercrime investigative journalist Geoff White and veteran foreign correspondent and renowned North Korea expert Jean Lee.
North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests, including two last year, and has warned it was ready to test an intercontinental ballistic missile at any time.
Abstract Existing scholarship on North Korea's nuclear programme remains overwhelmingly centred around questions of containment or engagement with the North Korean regime-state, amid international calls for denuclearization. Yet, scholarship has rarely interrogated the precise value of nuclear weapons to the regime-state. This article develops a new theoretical framework of nuclear ideology to explore the puzzle of the survival of North Korea. This framework aims to show how the North Korean nuclear programme is deeply entrenched within the state ideology of juche, as one device for continued regime-state survival. Through interviews with elite North Korean defectors and textual analysis of North Korean and international sources, I show that North Korea's nuclear ideology has been constructed according to different frames of meaning, targeting referent actors of international ‘enemy’ powers and domestic audiences. This article concludes that nuclear ideology functions primarily as a tool to arouse domestic legitimacy for the North Korean regime-state, by targeting elite actors within the highly stratified domestic population. From an international perspective, perception of North Korea's survival remains tied largely to the regime-state's physical possession of nuclear weapons. This article has extremely timely theoretical and policy implications given the current ‘dialogue’ between US and North Korean leaders. First, it opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry surrounding questions of the legitimacy of rogue states within international relations. Secondly, this article calls for a more robust understanding of the domestic-level politics of North Korea, in order to understand the regime-state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.
What nuclear strategy has North Korea adopted? What factors have driven the development of this nuclear strategy? This article examines the key attributes of Pyongyang’s nuclear program to offer possible answers to these questions of scholarly and practical importance. It argues that North Korea has likely adopted an assured retaliation strategy, threatening a nuclear second strike to deter US nuclear attacks. This strategy was chosen due to its superior feasibility and desirability: it requires only a modest cost-effective nuclear arsenal, reduces Pyongyang’s security dependence on Beijing, permits politically safe centralized control over the nuclear weapons, and is also relatively economical. This article calls into question the common views that North Korea has employed a catalytic strategy using its nuclear capabilities to induce China’s assistance, and that Pyongyang is developing an asymmetric escalation strategy or a brinkmanship strategy, which utilizes nuclear weapons primarily to counter the superior conventional forces of its adversaries.
This article analyses the narrowing range of policy choices for dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea. One of the central themes of my argument is that diplomacy has failed to constrain Pyongyang from proceeding across the nuclear threshold. North Korea's strategic worldview, in particular the regime's ingrained perception of the US as a threat to its very existence, has meant that it has resisted successfully bilateral and multilateral attempts to stop it going nuclear. Yet while diplomatic efforts have failed, I argue that the widely canvassed option of pre-emptive strikes to neutralise North Korea's nuclear program is unnecessarily risky and fraught with acute uncertainties. However carefully calibrated, such strikes would raise the likelihood of full-scale war on the peninsula. And, in any event, the complex targeting challenges facing the US mean that it would struggle to nullify Pyongyang's nuclear capability with any degree of certainty. The final section of the article examines the alternative of simply accepting North Korea's nuclear capability as a fait accompli. I argue that the advantages of this option have been underestimated and that, given the failure of diplomacy and the dangers associated with using military coercion, it is an alternative that deserves careful deliberation on the part of policy makers.
The final and midterm reports of the Panel of Experts provide insights into the effectiveness of sanctions and the challenges in enforcing them. These documents offer a comprehensive analysis of North Korea's strategies to evade sanctions and the international community's responses.
The document is a Congressional Research Service report on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. It details North Korea's advancements in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, international responses, and policy options for the United States. The report highlights the ongoing challenges posed by North Korea's capabilities and the diplomatic efforts to mitigate the threat, including sanctions, negotiations, and military deterrence.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270, adopted in 2016, was a significant step in imposing strict sanctions against North Korea following its nuclear tests and satellite launch earlier that year. The resolution expanded existing sanctions to include mandatory inspections of cargo entering or leaving North Korea, a ban on the export of coal, iron, and iron ore from North Korea except for livelihood purposes, and more stringent financial restrictions, including a ban on opening new branches of North Korean banks abroad. The resolution aimed to impede North Korea's ability to fund its nuclear and missile programs.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375, adopted in 2017, was a response to North Korea's nuclear tests. It expanded economic sanctions against the country, targeting its oil imports, textile exports, and the use of its laborers abroad, which are major sources of revenue for the regime. The resolution aimed to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear and missile programs by cutting off vital resources necessary for these programs.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in 2017, further tightened sanctions against North Korea in response to its ballistic missile tests. The resolution specifically aimed to limit North Korea's access to refined petroleum products and crude oil, and it banned the export of North Korean food products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone, wood, and vessels. Additionally, the resolution required countries to repatriate North Korean nationals earning income abroad, with the goal of cutting off funding sources for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
U.S. options to deal with North Koreas emerging nuclear weapons program include renewed engagement and a new negotiated agreement as called for by North Korea, economic sanctions, military action, or Cold War-style hostile containment. The United States is trying to form a multilateral coalition to stop the North Korean nuclear program, but the regional states hold differing views on the best options to pursue. China and Russia, at relatively low risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, are promoting a compromise whereby the United States will guarantee the security of the North Korean regime in return for an end to North Koreas nuclear weapons program. Japan, which is directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, prefers a tougher line, possibly including economic sanctions. South Korea is objectively at risk from North Korea, but because most South Koreans believe that the risk is very low, they favor a policy of dialogue and compromise. The positions of all these states may harden if North Korea stages a nuclear weapons test, but until that happens, the United States can expect little support for either economic sanctions or military action in dealing with North Korea.